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I. INTRODUCTION

Summary judgment, long a centerpiece of federal procedural
practice, is at something of a crossroads, as efforts to improve the
process of making and opposing summary judgment motions by
amending Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 stand in contrast to
challenges to the procedure, including an academic challenge to the
constitutionality of the procedure.1 This essay addresses one particular
challenge to federal summary judgment practice: the possibility of a
successful challenge to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
pursuant to Erie Railroad v. Tompkins2 and its progeny. Part II of this
essay addresses differences between summary judgment as practiced in
federal courts pursuant to Federal Rule 56 and summary judgment as
practiced in state courts, focusing in particular on differences in the ways
the federal courts and some state courts allocate the burdens on moving
and non-moving parties.3 Part III suggests that these differences are
problematic under Erie and its progeny, and in particular under the
Supreme Court’s 2001 decision in Semtek International, Inc. v.
Lockheed Martin Corp.4 Part III looks ahead to the Erie case decided in
the Supreme Court’s 2010 term5 and considers the possible impact of

Associate Professor, Indiana University School of Law-Indianapolis.
1. See Suja A. Thomas, Why Summary Judgment is Unconstitutional, 93 VA. L. REV. 139,
140 (2007).
2. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
3. See infra notes 7-39 and accompanying text.
4. 531 U.S. 497 (2001); see infra notes 40-76 and accompanying text.
5. Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431 (2010).
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that case on Federal Rule 56.6 The essay concludes that, in light of the
Supreme Court’s Erie jurisprudence, the future of uniform summary
judgment practice in federal courts is at least uncertain.
II. FEDERAL AND STATE STANDARDS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Summary judgment is not a creation of the Federal Rules. Even
those who challenge the constitutionality of summary judgment as
inconsistent with the historical right to a jury trial acknowledge that
summary judgment has a long history.7 Yet, in this area as in others, the
Federal Rules have been influential.
Approximately thirty-three
jurisdictions have adopted state rules or codes of civil procedure that are
modeled to a greater or lesser degree on the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.8 Twenty-four jurisdictions—twenty-two states plus the
District of Columbia and Guam—currently have summary judgment
rules that closely parallel the text of Federal Rule 56.9 This, of course,
leaves eighteen jurisdictions with different rules regimes—some of
which resemble the Federal Rules in some respects, and others of which
differ in significant ways—and even among those that follow the Federal
Rules model, some variation exists, both among states and between state
and federal rules.10 Given this variation, it is easy to imagine the
possibility of summary judgment in identical cases being granted under
one standard but denied under another.
The variation in the texts of summary judgment rules in some ways
understates the extent of the difference between federal and state
summary judgment practice. Even in those jurisdictions with procedural
rules modeled on the Federal Rules, practices can differ. A state’s rule
may be textually identical to the Federal Rule, and yet the state courts
are not bound by federal courts’ interpretations of the Federal Rule.11
The state courts may treat the federal courts’ interpretations as
persuasive, but they need not do so, and indeed, sometimes they are not

6. See infra notes 76-100 and accompanying text.
7. See, e.g., Thomas, supra note 1, at 140.
8. John B. Oakley, A Fresh Look at the Federal Rules in State Courts, 3 NEV. L.J. 354, 35657 (2003).
9. Id.; Guam R. Civ. P. 56, available at http://www.guamsupremecourt.com/PromOrder/
images/PromOrderNo06-006-01GRCP-LRSuperiorCt05032007.pdf.
10. Id. This is particularly so as of December 1, 2007, when the restyled Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure went into effect, resulting in substantial textual differences between the Federal
Rules and the state rules in those states that had previously mirrored the Federal Rules.
11. See infra notes 15-35.
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persuaded. Summary judgment represents a good example of this
phenomenon.
Consider the state courts’ treatment of the United States Supreme
Court’s decision in Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,12 part of the well-known
trilogy of summary judgment cases decided in 1986 that continue to
form the basis of the interpretation of Rule 56 at the federal level.13 In
Celotex, the Court confronted the question of what a moving party must
show to prevail on a summary judgment motion when the non-moving
party would have the burden of persuasion at trial—as will frequently be
the case when, as in Celotex, a defendant moves for summary
judgment.14 The Court rejected the respondent’s argument that a
defendant moving for summary judgment based on alleged infirmities in
the plaintiff’s claim must affirmatively demonstrate, through the
presentation of evidence that the plaintiff cannot prevail.15 Instead, the
Court concluded that the defendant only needs to “show” that the
plaintiff has failed to produce evidence sufficient to permit a reasonable
jury to find in the plaintiff’s favor, by surveying the record and noting
the absence of sufficient proof to establish the plaintiff’s claim.16 The
burden then falls to the plaintiff to come forward with evidence, in the
form of affidavits, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and so on,
demonstrating the existence of a genuine issue of material fact.17
In so describing the shifting burdens of production on a motion for
summary judgment, the Celotex Court resolved a circuit split at the
federal level, adopting what had to that point been the minority position
within the federal courts.18 Yet the decision did not eliminate a similar
split at the state level. To be sure, a large number of state courts cited
Celotex approvingly in the years immediately following the decision,
and state courts continue to do so to this day. Other state courts,
however, explicitly rejected Celotex and persist in that rejection more
than two decades later.19
12. 477 U.S. 317 (1986).
13. The other two cases in the trilogy are Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242
(1986), and Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
14. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 330-31.
15. Id. at 321-23, 324.
16. Id. at 323.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 319, 322.
19. E.g., compare Kourouvacilis v. General Motors Corp., 575 N.E.2d 734, 738 (Mass. 1991)
(following the holding of Celotex, that “[t]he burden on a moving party may be discharged by
showing that there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party’s case”), with Kahf v.
Charleston South Apartments, 461 N.E.2d 723, 729 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984) (stating that the moving
party must “shoulder the burden of establishing the lack of a material factual issue”).
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Celotex has had a mixed reception in jurisdictions that depart
significantly from the text of Federal Rule 56. In Florida, for example,
the state supreme court had decided in 1966 that, under Florida Rule of
Civil Procedure 1.510(c),20 a defendant filing a motion for summary
judgment bears the burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue
of material fact, by offering proof sufficient to defeat any reasonable
inferences in favor of the non-moving party.21 In the wake of Celotex,
the Florida Court of Appeals was invited to reconsider the prior state
standard, but it declined to do so.22 This was perhaps an easy decision
for the Florida Court of Appeals since, as the court noted, the Celotex
decision was based on language in Federal Rule 56(c) that did not appear
in the Florida rule.23 Under the circumstances, it would have been
wholly inappropriate for the Florida Court of Appeals to depart from
state supreme court precedent.24 In Texas, by comparison, the state
supreme court did re-examine its prior law following Celotex and
affirmatively decided to adhere to its precedent rather than accepting
Celotex.25 And the Oregon Supreme Court concluded that a postCelotex amendment to Oregon’s summary judgment rule did not
incorporate Celotex.26
Several jurisdictions with procedural rules that closely resemble the
Federal Rules have also rejected Celotex’s allocation of burdens on
motions for summary judgment. Most of the jurisdictions that have
refused to follow Celotex had addressed the question prior to Celotex
and thus, rather than rejecting Celotex as a matter of first impression,

20. Although Florida employs a different numbering system than the Federal Rules, its
summary judgment rule is textually very similar to the Federal Rule. Florida Rule of Civil
Procedure 1.510(c) provides, in pertinent part:
The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, admissions, affidavits, and other materials as would be admissible in
evidence on file show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
Id.
21. Holl v. Talcott, 191 So. 2d 40, 43-44 (Fla. 1966).
22. See 5G’s Car Sales, Inc. v. Florida Dept. of Law Enforcement, 581 So. 2d 212, 212 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
23. Id.
24. Florida’s rejection of the Celotex standard is the subject of a critical law review article.
See Leonard D. Pertnoy, Summary Judgment in Florida: The Road Less Traveled, 20 St. Thomas L.
Rev. 69 (2007).
25. See Casso v. Brand, 776 S.W.2d 551, 556 (Tex. 1989); see also Lesbrookton, Inc. v.
Jackson, 796 S.W.2d 276, 286 (Tex. App. 1990) (stating that “under the Texas summary judgment
scheme, the non-movant has no burden to produce proof of an element of his cause of action until
that element has been conclusively negated by movant”).
26. Jones v. General Motors Corp., 939 P.2d 608, 615-17 (Or. 1997).
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were adhering to prior state precedent. In Kentucky, for example, the
state supreme court had held in 1985 that “summary judgment is proper
only where the movant shows that the adverse party cannot prevail under
any circumstances.”27 After Celotex, the court refused to reconsider its
standard, emphasizing that summary judgment is appropriate only in
those cases in which, “as a matter of law, it appears that it would be
impossible for the respondent to produce evidence at the trial warranting
a judgment in his favor and against the movant.”28
At least one jurisdiction appears to have rejected Celotex as a
matter of first impression. In Indiana, the state court of appeals had
spoken on the nature of the burden borne by the defendant as moving
party, but it had done so only obliquely and with little elaboration.29 In
the wake of Celotex, however, the Indiana Supreme Court embraced the
courts of appeals’ standard and emphasized that it did indeed differ from
the Celotex standard, requiring the moving defendant to produce
evidence negating the plaintiff’s claim.30 This was true, despite the fact
that Indiana’s summary judgment rule is virtually identical to the Federal
Rule.31
The Supreme Court’s decision in Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.32
has received a similarly mixed response in the state courts. In Anderson,
the Court concluded that the standards for summary judgment under
Rule 56 and for judgment as a matter of law under Rule 50 are
identical.33 Under that standard, the Court concluded, determining
whether a genuine issue of material fact exists for trial requires a court to

27. Paintsville Hosp. Co. v. Rose, 683 S.W.2d 255, 256 (Ky. 1985).
28. Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel Serv. Ctr., Inc., 807 S.W.2d 476, 483 (Ky. 1991) (quoting
Paintsville Hosp., 683 S.W.2d at 256). See also O’Bryan v. Cave, 202 S.W.3d 585, 587 (Ky. 2006)
(following Steelvest).
29. See, e.g., Kahf v. Charleston South Apartments, 461 N.E.2d 723, 730 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984)
(stating that the moving party must “shoulder the burden of establishing the lack of a material
factual issue”); Jones v. City of Logansport, 436 N.E.2d 1138, 1143 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982) (“The
party seeking the summary judgment, therefore, has the burden to establish that there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact.”).
30. Jarboe v. Landmark Cmty. Newspapers of Indiana, Inc., 644 N.E.2d 118, 123 (Ind. 1994).
31. Rule 56(C) of the Indiana Rules of Trial Procedure provides, in pertinent part:
At the time of filing the motion or response, a party shall designate to the court all parts of
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions, matters of judicial notice, and any
other matters on which it relies for purposes of the motion. A party opposing the motion shall also
designate to the court each material issue of fact which that party asserts precludes entry of
summary judgment and the evidence relevant thereto. The judgment sought shall be rendered
forthwith if the designated evidentiary matter shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
32. 477 U.S. 242 (1986).
33. Id. at 252.
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take into account the standards for the burden of persuasion that would
exist at trial.34 This has particular significance in defamation cases
involving public figures (as was the case in Anderson). The New York
Times v. Sullivan standard35 requires the plaintiff to establish malice by
clear and convincing evidence. In order to defeat a summary judgment
motion, the plaintiff must establish the existence of a genuine issue of
material fact on malice, producing sufficient evidence to allow a
reasonable jury to conclude by clear and convincing evidence that
malice exists.36 As with Celotex, a number of state courts have refused
to follow Anderson. Some of these state opinions are in defamation
cases, with the state court expressly declining to apply the clear and
convincing evidence standard at the summary judgment stage.37 Other
courts have disagreed more generally with the Anderson approach to
weighing the evidence on a motion for summary judgment.38 In either
instance, it is apparent that summary judgment is more readily obtained
under federal standards than under the standards followed in these states.
The problem is thus defined: federal and state courts follow
different rules (or different interpretations of near-identical rules),
creating the potential for different results in similar cases in federal and
state courts. Given these different standards, and potentially different
outcomes under the different standards, parties might well choose a
federal forum or state forum based on the applicable summary judgment
standard, creating the potential for substantial forum-shopping.39 The
stage is set for an Erie problem.
III. SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND THE ERIE PROBLEM
The spirit of Erie may seem to be troubled by the application of
federal rather than state summary judgment standards in diversity cases,
and yet until relatively recently the question of whether the Erie doctrine
required federal courts to apply state summary judgment standards in

34. Id.
35. 376 U.S. 254, 285-86 (1964).
36. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 254.
37. See Moffat v. Brown, 751 P.2d 939, 943 (Alaska 1988); Chester v. Indianapolis
Newspapers, Inc., 553 N.E. 2d 137, 140-41 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990).
38. See, e.g., Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel, Serv. Ctr., Inc., 807 S.W.2d 476, 482 (Ky. 1991)
(concluding that in Kentucky the standards for summary judgment and a directed verdict are not
identical); Casso v. Brand, 776 S.W.2d 551, 556 (Tex. 1989) (concluding that neither Celotex nor
Anderson “compels us to abandon our established summary judgment procedure”); Parker v. Haller,
751 P.2d 372, 377 (Wyo. 1988).
39. See infra notes 43-48.
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diversity cases would have appeared easy. In Hanna v. Plumer,40 the
Supreme Court set out a two-pronged structure for addressing Erie
problems. The second prong represented a modification of what to that
point had been the “traditional” Erie analysis, developed over the run of
cases from Guaranty Trust v. York41 to Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Electric
Cooperative,42 focused on whether application of a federal rule or
practice rather than a state rule would be “outcome-determinative”—but,
the Hanna Court emphasized, only outcome-determinative in a way that
would produce forum-shopping and inequitable administration of the
laws.43 The first prong applies to situations covered by a Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure. In such cases, the court is only to consider whether the
applicable Federal Rule represents a valid exercise of the Supreme
Court’s rulemaking authority under the Rules Enabling Act.44 In other
words, in the broad (and rather unhelpful) language of Sibbach v. Wilson
& Co.,45 does the Rule “really regulate[] procedure”? If it does, and the
Federal Rule is valid, then the analysis is at an end. On the other hand,
if a Federal Rule did not control, the analysis then proceeds down a
second prong, considering whether a departure from state law by a
federal court would be outcome-determinative in light of Erie’s concerns
with forum-shopping and inequitable administration of the laws. Hanna
received some elaboration and subtle modification in subsequent
decades: In particular, the Supreme Court’s 1996 decision in Gasperini
v. Center for Humanities46 reintroduced the notion—stated by the Court
in Byrd but not mentioned in Hanna—that a federal court need not
follow a state law if doing so would infringe upon an essential
characteristic of the federal judiciary.47
Under this standard, Federal Rule 56 would appear to withstand
scrutiny rather easily in those situations where federal summary
judgment standards differ from state standards. As Federal Rule 56
specifically governs motions for summary judgment, there is no real
question that analysis would proceed down Hanna’s first prong,
focusing on whether Federal Rule 56 complies with the Rules Enabling
Act. And although the standards applicable to that analysis were left
rather vague at best, the Hanna Court emphasized that this was to be a
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
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less searching inquiry than the analysis of outcome-determinative effects
under the second prong of the Hanna analysis.48 Summary judgment, on
its face, fairly clearly represents a procedural mechanism for disposing
of claims or defenses so plainly without merit that the non-moving party
cannot reasonably prevail, and so it appears that the rule plausibly can be
characterized as a procedural rule that only incidentally affects
substantive rights.
The Supreme Court’s 2001 decision in Semtek International, Inc. v.
Lockheed Martin Corp.49 changed that equation. Although Semtek did
not overrule Hanna, or even call any of the Hanna Court’s analysis
directly into question, it did shift the analysis in significant ways. The
rather unusual setting of the Semtek case partially obscured the
decision’s ramifications, potentially calling into question the ability of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to serve as a uniform set of rules
applicable to all cases heard in federal district court. An analysis of Rule
56 in a post-Semtek world illustrates the problem, although it may not
reveal its full extent.
Semtek involved a dispute between two large producers of military
hardware. Semtek initially filed suit in California state court.50
Lockheed removed the case to federal court, with jurisdiction based on
diversity of citizenship. Once the case had arrived in the United States
District Court for the Central District of California, Lockheed promptly
moved to dismiss on the ground that the statute of limitations applicable
in California to Semtek’s claims had run.51 The district court granted
Lockheed’s motion, specifically stating in the process that the dismissal
was “on the merits and with prejudice.”52 This was unquestionably the
source of the difficulties that later emerged: although the federal district
court followed Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in
labeling its dismissal “on the merits,” California state courts treated
dismissals on statute of limitations grounds as without prejudice,
allowing plaintiffs to refile their claims in other jurisdictions with longer
limitations periods.53
Semtek appealed the dismissal to the Ninth Circuit, which affirmed
the district court’s decision. More significantly, Semtek also filed a
second lawsuit, this one in state court in Maryland, where the state’s

48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 473 (1965).
531 U.S. 497 (2001).
Id. at 491.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 499.
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three-year statute of limitations did not bar the claims.54 Lockheed once
again moved to dismiss, arguing that, given the dismissal of Semtek’s
first lawsuit “on the merits and with prejudice,” Semtek’s second lawsuit
was barred by claim preclusion.55 Semtek responded that, whatever
label the district court in California may have placed on its judgment, the
judgment could have no greater effect than a judgment of the California
state court would have been given had the initial lawsuit not been
removed to federal court.56 The stage thus was set for an Erie conflict—
a conflict that ultimately found its way to the United States Supreme
Court.
A straightforward application of Hanna v. Plumer suggests that,
despite its somewhat unusual setting, Semtek should have been a
relatively easy case to resolve. The federal district court’s decision to
identify its dismissal on statute of limitations grounds as “on the merits
and with prejudice” was in compliance with Rule 41(b) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, which in its present form states:
If the plaintiff fails to prosecute or to comply with these rules or a
court order, a defendant may move to dismiss the action or any claim
against it. Unless the dismissal order states otherwise, a dismissal
under this subdivision (b) and any dismissal not under this rule—
except one for lack of jurisdiction, improper venue, or failure to join a
party under Rule 19—operates as an adjudication on the merits.57

Because a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure was involved, analysis
of the discrepancy between state and federal law would have proceeded
(assuming that the Federal Rules were found to control the question)
under Hanna’s first prong, with the court considering whether Rule
41(b) complied with the Rules Enabling Act. And although one
commentator presciently described potential problems with Rule 41(b)
under the Rules Enabling Act some fifteen years before Semtek was
decided,58 Hanna’s seemingly deferential standard for reviewing Federal
Rules, as opposed to non-Rules-based federal practices or procedures,
would have seemed likely to uphold the Rule. After all, in the decades

54. Lockheed again attempted to remove to federal court. As a citizen of Maryland, it could
not do so on diversity grounds, see 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1991), and the federal district court in
Maryland rejected Lockheed’s effort to remove on federal question grounds, noting that the asserted
federal question arose only by way of a defense. See Semtek, 531 U.S. at 499-500.
55. Semtek, 531 U.S. at 500.
56. Id.
57. FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b).
58. See Stephen B. Burbank, Interjurisdictional Preclusion, Full Faith and Credit and Federal
Common Law: A General Approach, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 733, 780-86 (1986).
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following Hanna, the Supreme Court had never invalidated a Federal
Rule on Erie/Hanna grounds.59
Semtek, though, substantially changed the picture. Rejecting
Lockheed’s argument that Rule 41(b) controlled the question before the
Court, the Semtek Court concluded that if Rule 41(b) did in fact require
that the California district court judgment be given preclusive effect, it
would probably violate the Rules Enabling Act: The Rule would require
the extinction of a substantive claim that would be allowed to continue
in state court, and thus would affect substantive rights.60 Interpreting
Rule 41(b) as a rule of claim preclusion, in the Court’s view, would also
run afoul of the twin aims of Erie: it would encourage parties to forumshop to obtain desirable claim preclusion rules, and it would ultimately
lead to inequitable administration of the laws, as different substantive
results would emerge in federal and state courts for reasons unrelated to
the substantive merits of the claims.61 The Semtek Court avoided the
difficulty through a nifty act of interpretation, asserting that the phrase
“on the merits” in Rule 41(b) did not mean what it appeared to mean—
that is, it did not mean that a judgment so described under Rule 41(b)
would have to be treated as a judgment on the merits for claim
preclusion purposes.62
Semtek’s incorporation into Hanna’s first prong of the twin
concerns of Erie—avoidance of forum-shopping and inequitable
administration of the laws63—made a certain amount of historical sense.
The Rules Enabling Act states that a Federal Rule “shall not abridge,
enlarge or modify any substantive right.”64 The outcome-determinative
test of Guaranty Trust was originally stated, after all, as a way of
distinguishing substantive law from procedural law: the Court stated that
whether a law is substantive “in the aspect that alone is relevant to our
problem” turns on whether application of a different rule in federal court
would “significantly affect the result of the litigation.”65 Although
59. A number of authors have commented on the fact that the Supreme Court has never
invalidated a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure for violating Hanna’s “substantive right” prong. See
Martin H. Redish & Uma M. Amuluru, The Supreme Court, The Rules Enabling Act, and the
Politicization of the Federal Rules: Constitutional and Statutory Implications, 90 MINN. L. REV.
1303, 1332 (2006). See also Bernadette Bollas Genetin, Expressly Repudiating Implied Repeals
Analysis: A New Framework for Resolving Conflicts Between Congressional Statutes and Federal
Rules, 51 EMORY L.J. 677, 698 (2002).
60. Semtek, 531 U.S. at 503.
61. Id. at 503-04.
62. Id. at 501-02.
63. Id. at 508-09.
64. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (1990).
65. Guaranty Trust v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945).
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Hanna framed its first prong not in terms of Guaranty Trust’s outcomedeterminative test but rather in terms of the validity of a Federal Rule
under the Rules Enabling Act, the question asked under that inquiry
bears a strong resemblance to the question asked under Hanna’s second
prong, notwithstanding the Hanna Court’s insistence that the two
inquiries are different.
Semtek significantly fleshed out the theretofore poorly defined test
for determining whether a Federal Rule violates a substantive right in
violation of the Rules Enabling Act. The extent to which it did so seems
not to have been recognized by other courts in the wake of the
decision—perhaps because of the impenetrability of much of the case’s
analysis—Semtek has been largely ignored by the courts of appeals in
cases that do not involve preclusion.66 Yet the Semtek Court’s analysis
has implications that potentially reach far beyond the narrow confines of
claim preclusion, implications that ultimately may affect the continued
viability of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as a uniform set of
procedural rules for lawsuits brought in federal courts.
It is important at the outset not to overstate the potential impact of
Semtek, as the importation of the twin aims of Erie into the analysis of
the Rules’ validity may suggest. After all, the adoption of the Federal
Rules in 1938 represented a significant departure from pre-Rules
procedures in many respects, and those departures could easily be seen
as implicating the twin concerns of Erie. The discovery rules, for
example, vastly expanded the ability of a party to compel opposing

66. Courts commonly cite Semtek for the proposition that the federal common law of claim
preclusion should incorporate state law (to the extent doing so is not incompatible with federal
interests) in situations where the original case was in federal court because of diversity of
citizenship. See, e.g., Q Int’l Courier, Inc. v. Smoak, 441 F.3d 214, 218 (4th Cir. 2006); Hells
Canyon Preservation Council v. U.S. Forest Serv., 403 F.3d 683, 686 (9th Cir. 2005); Headwaters,
Inc. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 399 F.3d 1047, 1052 (9th Cir. 2005); Jackson v. FIE Corp., 302 F.3d 515,
529 n.58 (5th Cir. 2002). Other courts have concluded that the Semtek rationale extends to issue
preclusion as well. See, e.g., In re Baycol Products Litig, No. 09-1069, 2010 WL 10397, at *2 (10th
Cir. Jan. 5, 2010); Taco Bell Corp. v. TBWA Chiat/Day, Inc., 552 F.3d 1137, 1144 (9th Cir. 2009);
In re Sonus Networks, Inc. Shareholder Derivative Litig., 499 F.3d 47, 48-49 (1st Cir. 2007);
Matosantos Comm. Corp. v. Applebee’s Int’l, Inc., 245 F.3d 1203, 1208 (10th Cir. 2001). Beyond
that, the Eleventh Circuit applied Semtek to conclude that in a diversity declaratory judgment action
governed by Georgia substantive law, the federal court’s declaratory judgment should not reach
more broadly than would a declaratory judgment rendered by a Georgia court. See Palmer & Cay,
Inc. v. Marsh & McLennan Cos., Inc., 404 F.3d 1297, 1310 (11th Cir. 2005). The Seventh Circuit
devoted a paragraph to Semtek, but did not otherwise attempt to apply the decision, as part of an
extended review of the Supreme Court’s Erie jurisprudence in Houben v. Telular Corp., 309 F.3d
1028, 1035-36 (7th Cir. 2002). It seems that no court of appeals panel has yet wrestled with
Semtek’s broader implications.
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parties and non-parties to produce relevant information.67 In that setting,
it is easy to imagine an attorney choosing a federal forum because of the
perceived advantages that enhanced discovery would give to the
attorney’s case. The discovery rules, in other words, certainly had the
potential to lead to forum-shopping. Similarly, we might expect that the
then-new discovery rules would have had a systematic impact on the
outcomes of some categories of cases depending on whether a case was
in federal or state court—in other words: they would have resulted in
inequitable administration of the laws.68 The differences between
federal and state discovery rules have diminished over time, but
differences still exist—the mandatory discovery regime of Federal Rule
26(a), for example, has not been adopted in many states, even those with
rules regimes that largely follow the Federal Rules. And these
differences may well implicate the twin concerns of Erie.69 Semtek does
not—it cannot—mean that the federal discovery rules cannot be applied
in diversity cases where state courts would follow different discovery
rules.70 Such a conclusion would mean that Semtek has effectively
overthrown the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in diversity cases, a
conclusion clearly not contemplated by the decision itself.71 Rather, the
concern about Erie’s twin aims must be read in conjunction with
Semtek’s first concern regarding the potential applicability of Rule
41(b): that Rule 41(b), if it had controlled, would have directly
extinguished a claim that, had the case been in state court rather than
federal court, would have been permitted to continue.72 Yet even
limiting Semtek’s impact to those situations in which a Federal Rule
would directly terminate a lawsuit that would continue in state court (or,
alternatively, would allow to continue in federal court a lawsuit that
would terminate in state court) has potentially broad implications for the

67. The Supreme Court has consistently reaffirmed that the federal discovery rules “are to be
accorded a broad and liberal treatment[.]” Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 177 (1979) (citing
Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379 U.S. 104, 114-15 (1964), and Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 501
(1947)).
68. See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 468 (1965) (noting that when the choice between a
state or federal forum will have an outcome-determinative effect, forum-shopping and inequitable
administration of the laws will result).
69. Id. at 464 (“[A] non-uniform system increases uncertainty and creates the opportunity for
procedural gamesmanship without providing any offsetting benefits . . . .”).
70. Semtek Int’l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 509 (2001) (noting that the
decisions reference to state law would not apply “in situations in which the state law is incompatible
with federal interests”).
71. Id.
72. Id. at 503-04.
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Federal Rules in diversity cases.73 These implications may be seen by
considering the potential impact of the decision on Rule 56.
Consider a lawsuit filed in federal district court in Indiana. The
plaintiff has a weak claim, and the claim’s weakness is made manifest
during discovery. The defendant then moves for summary judgment.
According to the federal standard set forth in Celotex, the defendant does
not need to negate the plaintiff’s claim; rather, the defendant only needs
to “show”—by surveying the available evidence—that no genuine issue
of material fact exists; the burden then shifts to the plaintiff to identify
specific evidence in the record that demonstrates the existence of a
genuine issue of material fact.74 The difference may be somewhat
difficult to articulate, but it is real: it is generally much harder to
establish a negative, as the Indiana interpretation of its Rule 56
requires,75 than it is to suggest a negative and require the opposing party
to prove a positive, as Celotex requires. A defendant in this situation,
facing a weak claim, would prefer to be in federal court; by contrast, a
plaintiff would prefer to operate under the more forgiving regime of the
Indiana rule. A clear potential for forum-shopping would exist.
Similarly, although perhaps less pronouncedly, inequitable
administration of the laws could result. Semtek’s analysis thus appears
to put Federal Rule 56 in peril, at least in diversity cases in those
jurisdictions that employ different summary judgment standards, either
as a matter of rule or as a matter of decisional law.
Semtek itself was able to avoid the dramatic step of invalidating a
Federal Rule through a creative—if not entirely convincing—act of
interpretation: a judgment “on the merits” for the purposes of Federal
Rule 41(b) need not be a judgment “on the merits” for claim preclusion
purposes.76 But the escape hatch of interpretation utilized by the Semtek
Court is not available in the summary judgment context. A motion for
summary judgment is a motion for summary judgment, and interpretive
twists cannot escape the fact that summary judgments in both state and
federal courts serve essentially the same broad purpose: to identify
those cases that are so one-sided that no reasonable jury could possibly
find for the non-moving party, thus negating the need for a trial. If
Semtek is to be taken at its word, then Federal Rule 56 appears to be in
very serious danger of invalidation indeed.

73. This is so because Rule 56, like Rule 41(b), could potentially terminate a lawsuit under
different standards in different courts. See supra notes 12-37 and accompanying text.
74. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986).
75. See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text.
76. Semtek Int’l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 501-02 (2001).
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IV. LOOKING AHEAD
How serious is the danger that a court, deciding a diversity case,
would conclude that Federal Rule 56, by terminating a lawsuit that
would be allowed to continue under a different state summary judgment
standard, abridges substantive rights and therefore violates the Rules
Enabling Act? At one level, it seems almost unimaginable: in the seven
decades since the adoption of the Federal Rules, summary judgment has
become a cornerstone of federal procedural practice—perhaps not an
“essential characteristic” of the federal judiciary, in the words of
Gasperini77 and Byrd,78 but something close to it—and although
invalidating Rule 56 in the limited context of diversity cases involving
the law of states that place a greater burden on moving defendants than
the Federal Rule would not eliminate the procedure of summary
judgment altogether, it would relinquish federal control over an
important procedural mechanism and would call into question the
viability of a uniform set of Federal Rules, applicable in all cases
brought in federal court. Adding to the unlikelihood of this result is the
relative lack of influence that Semtek has had in the years since its
decision: as noted previously, although Semtek stands, for the moment,
as the Supreme Court’s most recent comprehensive statement of the Erie
doctrine, the case has been largely overlooked in subsequent judicial
decisions—suggesting that it is largely overlooked by litigants and their
attorneys as well.79 Semtek has potentially far-reaching implications, but
those implications largely are yet to be explored by the courts.
And those implications may not be as far-reaching as they first
appeared to be. As this essay was being finalized, the Supreme Court
issued its decision in Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates v. Allstate
Insurance Company.80 Shady Grove involves an apparent conflict
between Federal Rule 23, setting forth standards for class actions,81 and
77. Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, 518 U.S. 415, 431 (1996).
78. Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Co-op., 356 U.S. 525, 537 (1958).
79. See Earl C. Dudley, Jr. & George Rutherglen, Deforming the Federal Rules: An Essay on
What’s Wrong with the Recent Erie Decisions, 92 VA. L. REV. 707, 722-23 (2006). This article
points out that the holding of Semtek, i.e. the narrow construction of the phrase “adjudication on the
merits” to avoid a conflict with Rule 41(b), “originated in Semtek itself” and has not been adopted
elsewhere. Id.
80. 130 S. Ct. 1431 (2010).
81. FED. R. CIV. P. 23:
(a) Prerequisites. One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative
parties on behalf of all members only if: (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all
members is impracticable; (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class; (3) the
claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the
class; and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the class.
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Section 901 of New York’s Civil Practice Law and Rules, which, like
Federal Rule 23, sets out basic prerequisites for maintenance of a lawsuit
as a class action, but which, unlike Federal Rule 23, limits the use of the
class action mechanism in cases seeking a statutory penalty or a
recovery with a minimum set by statute.82 The putative class in Shady
Grove sought statutory payments based on Allstate’s failure to pay
insurance benefits in a timely manner and to pay interest on overdue
insurance benefits as required by law.83 Because the statute establishing
the penalty did not specifically authorize lawsuits seeking the penalty to
be brought as class actions, Section 901(b) would have barred the
plaintiffs from proceeding as a class had the lawsuit been brought in
state court.84 The lawsuit was filed in federal court, however, and the
plaintiffs contended that Section 901(b)’s restrictions on class actions
could not control federal courts, where Rule 23 sets out the only
prerequisites for bringing class actions. Both the district court and the
Second Circuit disagreed, concluding that Section 901(b) must be
applied in federal court in a diversity case premised on a violation of
New York law, but the Supreme Court reversed.85
Structurally, the decision is unremarkable: all members of the
Court follow the well-established analytical structure set out in Hanna v.
Plumer and subsequent cases.86 The first part of the Court’s decision,
holding that Rule 23 controls the question presented and therefore
displaces New York’s section 902(b), is surely worthy of commentary,
but is perhaps best left to another forum. Although the question of
whether Rule 23 directly conflicts with section 902(b) is certainly
debatable—the Supreme Court split 5-4 on the question, after all, and
the majority disagreed with the unanimous Second Circuit panel—it
would be virtually impossible to argue that Federal Rule 56, setting forth
the procedures for filing a motion for summary judgment and setting
forth the circumstances in which such a motion may be granted, does not
control a motion filed in federal court and designated as a motion for
summary judgment, even in a diversity case. When a motion for
summary judgment is filed in the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Indiana, it is self-evident that Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 56 governs, and that any contrary provisions in Indiana Rule
of Trial Practice 56 (including interpretations of the Indiana Rule that

82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
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are inconsistent with federal interpretations of the Federal Rule) will be
excluded.
More significant for present purposes is the Court’s analysis of
whether Federal Rule 23 complies with the Rules Enabling Act. Given
the shape of the Court’s analysis of potential problems raised by Rule
41(b) in Semtek, this was the portion of the case on which clarity was
perhaps most urgently needed. But although the clarity of Justice
Scalia’s analysis of Rule 23’s validity87 contrasts favorably with the
murk of Justice Scalia’s discussion of Rule 41(b) in Semtek, clear
guidance nevertheless fails to emerge from the Court’s opinions, for
although a majority of the Court concludes that Rule 23 is a valid
exercise of the Court’s rulemaking authority, that majority is fractured as
to the rationale.
Justice Scalia sees the issue of the Rule’s validity as
straightforward. Justice Scalia’s starting point is the uncontroversial
notion that, under Hanna, the Rule’s validity is to be determined not by
the classic Erie analysis of whether departure from state law would
affect the outcome of the case in a way likely to produce forum shopping
and inequitable administration of the laws; instead, the focus is on
whether the Rule governs only the manner and means of enforcing
substantive rights, or whether the Rule itself amounts to a definition of
substantive rights. As Justice Scalia sees it, this inquiry is to be
undertaken with little if any reference to the state law that the Federal
Rule displaces.88 The Rule is either categorically procedural (and
therefore valid) or substantive (and therefore invalid); it cannot be “valid
in some jurisdictions and invalid in others—or valid in some cases and
invalid in others—depending upon whether its effect is to frustrate a
state substantive law (or a state procedural law enacted for substantive
purposes).”89 By this approach, Rule 23 is plainly procedural: it
represents nothing more than a joinder device, without substantively
modifying the remedy to which any one individual class member may be
entitled.90

87. Describing Justice Scalia’s analysis of Rule 23’s validity as “clear” is not meant here as
an endorsement of his approach. Whatever else may be said about Justice Scalia’s opinion, though,
it sets forth a relatively straightforward test, one that, although perhaps not always easy to apply,
nevertheless requires consideration of fewer factors than the alternatives voiced by the concurring
and dissenting opinions.
88. See Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1435 (“In sum, it is not the substantive or procedural
nature or purpose of the affected state law that matters, but the substantive or procedural nature of
the Federal Rule.”).
89. Id.
90. Id.
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Justice Scalia’s analysis of Rule 23’s validity is fairly
straightforward, and it is certainly easier to apply than the standard set
forth in Semtek, yet it remains troubling. For one thing, Justice Scalia
fails to grapple with his own Semtek handiwork: although Justice Scalia
wrote for a unanimous Court in Semtek, and that opinion pivoted around
the Court’s conclusion that a particular interpretation of Rule 41(b)
would arguably violate the Rules Enabling Act, Justice Scalia’s Shady
Grove opinion almost entirely ignores Semtek.91 Entirely gone is
Semtek’s suggestion that whether a Federal Rule is substantive may be
determined, at least in part, by asking whether application of the Rule
would be outcome-determinative in light of the twin aims of Erie.92 The
reference is not missed, as the Semtek Court’s importation of the ErieGuaranty Trust outcome-determination test threatened to undermine
Hanna’s clear line between analysis of whether a federal court may
depart from state law by applying a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure and
analysis of whether a federal court may depart from state law by
applying judge-made federal law. Indeed, Justice Scalia’s Shady Grove
opinion emphasizes the fundamental difference between the two
inquiries. Justice Scalia, it appears, would effectively overrule Semtek
by ignoring it.
The implications of Justice Scalia’s approach for summary
judgment and Rule 56 at first glance seem clear. Justice Scalia focuses
on the Federal Rule itself, without examining individual state rules (at
least those that are nominally procedural) or considering the rationales
that the states put forward for their departures from federal practice.
Thus, Justice Scalia would ignore the reasons why state courts have
refused to follow Celotex, even if some of those reasons may implicate
substantive concerns. The focus would be solely on whether, in
Sibbach’s terms, Rule 56 “really regulates procedure.”93 And, given
Rule 56’s centrality in federal procedural practice and Justice Scalia’s
forthright acknowledgment that the Supreme Court had never
invalidated a Federal Rule under the Rules Enabling Act,94 it seems
extremely unlikely that Justice Scalia (and the justices who join his
opinion) would conclude that Rule 56 is substantive and therefore
invalid.

91. Justice Scalia cites Semtek only twice, both times for the proposition that where a Federal
Rule may plausibly be read in two ways, one of which would violate the Rules Enabling Act, the
Court should adopt the reading that would not require invalidating the Rule. Shady Grove, 130 S.
Ct. at 1442 (citing Semtek Int’l, Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 503-04 (2001)).
92. See Semtek, 531 U.S. at 503-05.
93. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1442 (quoting Sibbach v. Wilson, 312 U.S. 1, 14 (1941))
94. Id.
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Justice Stevens, concurring in the judgment,95 rejects Justice
Scalia’s categorical approach to determining if a Federal Rule violates
the Rules Enabling Act, and in doing so deprives Justice Scalia’s
approach of a majority. Justice Stevens asserts that whether a Federal
Rule enlarges, abridges, or modifies substantive rights cannot be
determined by looking at the Rule in isolation to see if, by its terms, it
relates only to the manner and means of enforcing rights defined
elsewhere by substantive law.96 He asserts, instead, that determining the
validity of a Federal Rule requires consideration, not only of the text of
the Federal Rule itself, but also of the details of the state law that it
purports to displace. Merely categorizing the state law as “procedural”
(relating to the manner and means of enforcing rights) or “substantive”
(relating to the definition of the rights themselves) will not fully resolve
the question, for a nominally procedural rule “may in some instances
become so bound up with the state-created right or remedy that it defines
the scope of that substantive right or remedy.”97 In such cases, Justice
Stevens insists, a Federal Rule cannot displace state law and therefore, if
a conflict cannot be avoided by an interpretive act, must yield.98 In his
view, however, section 902(b) does not represent one of the “rare”99
state rules that, though framed in procedural terms, serve effectively to
define substantive rights and remedies. The bar for finding a violation
of the Rules Enabling Act, he insists, is “high.”100
The Shady Grove opinions are frustrating in their unwillingness to
engage the broad language of Semtek. They may nevertheless contain
the key to unlocking the mystery of how to reconcile the Semtek opinion
with the idea that federal courts may follow Federal Rule 56 rather than
contrary state rules (or contrary interpretations of state rules) in diversity
cases. The key to Semtek, perhaps, ultimately is not that application of
Federal Rule 41(b) as a rule of claim preclusion would have
conclusively terminated a particular claim that would not have been
conclusively terminated had the initial lawsuit remained in state court.
As both Justice Scalia and Justice Stevens note in their Shady Grove
opinions (as does Justice Ginsburg in her dissenting opinion),101 statutes
95. Justice Stevens also joins the portion of Justice Scalia’s opinion addressing whether Rule
23 conflicts with section 902(b) and thereby supplies the fifth vote for that portion of the opinion.
See id. at 1448 (Stevens, J., concurring).
96. Id. at 1449 (Stevens, J., concurring).
97. Id. at 1450 (Stevens, J., concurring).
98. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1452 (Stevens, J., concurring).
99. Id. at 1455 n.13 (Stevens, J., concurring).
100. Id. at 1457.
101. See id. at 1454 n.12 (Scalia, J.), 1450 (Stevens, J., concurring), 1471 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting).
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of limitations, though procedural in a sense, have long been regarded as
substantive for Erie purposes;102 they function, in effect, as part of a
substantive definition of rights and remedies—as part of the substantive
definition of a plaintiff’s claim. If, as in Semtek, California decides to
treat the running of the statute of limitations not as the termination of the
plaintiff’s entire claim but rather only as the extinction of a right to a
remedy under California law, then a federal court’s decision, applying
Federal Rule 41(b), to treat a dismissal on statute of limitations grounds
as claim preclusive would amount to a substantive rewriting of the
elements of the plaintiff’s claim. Contrast this with summary judgment,
which (when sought against a plaintiff) does not rewrite the elements of
the plaintiff’s claim but rather measures the adequacy of the plaintiff’s
evidence to determine if a reasonable factfinder could find for the
plaintiff at trial. In this way, summary judgment looks more like part of
the “manner and means” of enforcing a substantive right, and less like an
alteration of the substantive right itself.103
In the days following the Shady Grove decision, Federal Rule 56
appears to be on firmer ground than it was when Semtek represented the
Court’s last major statement on how to assess the validity of a Federal
Rule. It was always difficult to imagine that the Supreme Court would
invalidate Rule 56, regardless of Semtek’s implications, and it is still
more difficult to imagine now. Yet given the Court’s divisions in Shady
Grove, the unanimous opinion in Semtek still stands as the Court’s most
recent authoritative guidance as to how to assess a Federal Rule’s
validity under the Rules Enabling Act. And as long as that remains the
case, Federal Rule 56 will remain in the shadow of Erie.

102. See Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 110 (1945).
103. This distinction may not be entirely persuasive. For example, Justice Stevens notes in his
Shady Grove concurrence that burdens of proof are regarded as substantive for Erie purposes. See
id. at 1450 n.4 (Stevens, J., concurring); see also id. at 1468 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). The Celotex
standard for summary judgment under Rule 56 and competing state rules and interpretations may be
seen as variations on the burden of persuasion, which is a sub-unit of the burden of proof. The
various summary judgment standards, however, do not change the parties’ ultimate burdens of
persuasion, and therefore may possibly be regarded as distinct—and not substantive, or at least less
substantive—for Erie purposes.
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